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Since the submission of this manuscript, the international climate surrounding
extradition and the death penalty continues to change. For example, Mexico has
asked the International Court of Justice (ICJ) at The Hague to stop the United
States from executing dozens of Mexicans held on death row on the grounds that
the Mexican citizens were not informed of their consular rights. BBC News,
Mexico Seeks to Block U.S. Executions, (Jan. 21, 2003) available at
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/americas/2678775.stm.
In addition, Germany recently told the United States it will withhold evidence
against September 11 suspect Zacarias Moussaoui unless it receives assurances the
information will not be used to secure a death penalty against him. BBC News,
Germany Withholds Moussaoui Evidence, (Sept. 1, 2002) available at
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/europe/2229231.stm. The author submits
that these new developments further strengthen the thesis advanced herein.
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I. INTRODUCTION
According to a recent poll, Americans favor military trials,
without the right of appeal, for foreign terrorists, and agree that
military courts should be able to sentence foreign terrorists to
1
death. Attorney General John Ashcroft responded to European
critics (who are resisting extradition to the United States of deatheligible members of the al-Qaeda terrorist network) by saying: “I
believe the law, which is clear in relation to capital punishment in
2
the United States, is a law that we ought to be able to enforce.”
President George Bush responded to Spanish criticism of military
courts for al-Qaeda terrorists:
It is the right decision to make and I will explain that to
any leader who asks . . . . I look forward to explaining to
my friend, the president of Spain, why I made the
decision . . . . It makes eminent sense to have the military
tribunal option available . . . . It makes sense for national
security purposes. It makes sense for the protection3of
potential jurors, it makes sense for homeland security.
Americans and their government are apparently in accord.
They agree that foreign-born terrorists should be quickly tried in
military courts, with no appeal, and there face the possibility of the
death penalty. Many Americans, and apparently some in the
Executive Branch of government, may be surprised to learn that
much of the world disagrees with the U.S., and more importantly,
will not cooperate—even on a matter as pressing as bringing
members of al-Qaeda to justice—in extraditing such persons if they
4
face the death penalty or military trials.
1. National Public Radio (NPR) reported that 64% of respondents favored
military tribunals for non-citizens suspected of terrorist activities and captured
outside of the United States; 61% thought that there should be no appeal to
civilian courts; and 68% felt that the court should have the power to sentence
someone to death. At the same time, only 23% would have favored a military
court for Timothy McVey for bombing the Oklahoma City Federal Building.
NPR/Kaiser/Kennedy School Poll on Civil Liberties: Military Tribunals (Nov. 25, 2001),
at
http://www.npr.org/news/specials/civillibertiespoll/civilliberties_supplement.ht
ml (last visited Nov. 11, 2002).
2. Joe Murphy & David Wastell, Britain Angers America on Terrorist Extradition
Deal, SUNDAY TELEGRAPH (London), October 7, 2001, at 01.
3. Duncan Campbell, War in Afghanistan: Let UN Team in or Else, Bush Warns
Iraq, THE GUARDIAN (London), November 27, 2001, at 5.
4. As will be explained in Parts II & III, these countries usually only extradite
after the requesting country provides assurances that the death penalty will not be
imposed or executed.
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This article will review international extradition law regarding
the surrender of fugitives from countries that do not have capital
punishment to countries that do (111 countries have abolished
5
capital punishment ). While this issue is broader than al-Qaeda,
and even broader than terrorism, the issue has increased
significance after the September 11, 2001 attacks on the World
Trade Center and the Pentagon.
II. THE PROBLEM UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW
At least since the 1648 Treaty of Westphalia ended the Thirty
6
Years War, international law has dealt predominately with
sovereign nation states rather than individual people. Under this
concept, an individual had “no remedy of his own” and it was left to
7
the states to take up the case of one of its citizens abroad. Aside
“from a few anomalous cases . . . individuals were not subject of
8
rights and duties under international law.”
World War II,
beginning with the Nuremberg trials, and the creation of the
United Nations, transformed attitudes about the Nation State and
9
its obligations to individuals. Nowhere is this remarkable change
more evident than in the conjunction of extradition with the death
penalty as a human rights issue. The push to bring terrorists to an
5. Death Penalty Information Center, The Death Penalty: An International
Perspective, available at http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/dpicintl.html (noting that
as of August 2002, 111 total nations are now abolitionist in law or in practice, 76
for all crimes, 15 for ordinary crimes, and 20 are abolitionist de facto).
6. J.L. BRIERLY, THE LAW OF NATIONS 5 (6th ed., 1963); R.R. PALMER & JOEL
COLTON, A HISTORY OF THE M ODERN WORLD 126-131 (Alfred A. Knopf ed., 3d ed.
1965).
7. BRIERLY, supra note 6, at 277.
8. Louis B. Sohn, The New International Law: Protection of the Rights of
Individuals Rather than States, 32 AM. U. L. REV. 1, 9 (1982).
9. Id. at 1. Sohn states:
The modern rules of international law concerning human rights are
the result of a silent revolution of the 1940’s, a revolution that was
almost unnoticed at the time. Its effects have now spread around the
world, destroying idols to which humanity paid obeisance for centuries.
Just as the French Revolution ended the divine rights of kings, the
human rights revolution that began at the 1945 San Francisco
Conference of the United Nations has deprived the sovereign states of
the lordly privilege of being the sole possessors of rights under
international law. States have had to concede to ordinary human
beings the status of subjects of international law, to concede that
individuals are no longer mere objects, mere pawns in the hands of
states.
Id.
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acquaintance with the United States’ brand of justice, including the
death penalty with military courts meeting that penalty out,
coupled with the refusal of many countries to extradite under those
conditions, gives the issue both currency and importance far
beyond what it otherwise might have had if the issue had been
limited to a few relatively obscure fugitives.
Extradition of people who face the death penalty now attracts
10
worldwide attention and opposition and threatens to interfere
11
with U.S. foreign policy. Even if the United States were to capture
12
Osama bin Laden and his associates, trial in military courts, or
10. On May 28, 2001 the South African Constitutional Court ruled that the
deportation of a suspected al-Qaeda terrorist to the United States where he faced
the death penalty violated the South African Constitution. Mohamed and
Another v. President of the RSA and Others, [2001] (7) BCLR 685, 2001 SACLR
LEXIS 37 (CC). South Africa is only one of many Nations that will not extradite
even al-Qaeda terrorists to nations that might impose the death penalty. It seems
highly unlikely that any of the 15 member states of the European Union would
extradite anyone facing the death penalty without assurances that the death
penalty would not be sought or imposed. See, e.g., Julian Knowles, More Haste, Less
Justice, THE TIMES (London), Oct. 9, 2001, at Law 5; Bill Glauber, Europe Moves to
Unify Efforts Against Terror, BALT. SUN., Sept. 30, 2001, at A8; Stephen Romei, Powers
at Odds on Executions -- War on Terror, THE WEEKEND AUSTRALIAN, Oct. 6, 2001, at 13;
Ellen Hale, Death Penalty Could Affect Extradition, USA TODAY, Oct. 3, 2001, at A6;
Frances Gibb, EU Extradition Deal Falters, THE TIMES (London), Sept. 28, 2001, at
4M; Spain Rules Out Extradition of Terror Suspects to US, AGENCE FRANCE PRESSE, Nov.
23, 2001, available at 2001 WL 25069895; Ron Fournier, Bush, Aznar Set Aside
Differences, ASSOCIATED PRESS, AP ONLINE, Nov. 28, 2001, at *1
11. For a detailed exposition of how human rights differences with allied
nations interferes with U.S. interests and policies, see generally Matthew W.
Henning, Extradition Controversies: How Enthusiastic Prosecutions can Lead to
International Incidents, 22 B.C. INT’ L & COMP. L. REV. 347 (1999). For postSeptember 11 commentary, see Joyelyn Noveck, France’s Anti-Terrorism Judge, Revered
by Some and Resented By Others, Tracks Suspects Across the Globe, ASSOCIATED PRESS
NEWSWIRE, Dec. 4, 2001 at *1. Noveck relates the activities of Jean-Louis Bruguiere
“France’s hard-driving, antiterrorism judge,” who worries that cooperation on
counter terrorism efforts between the United States and France “will suffer if the
Bush administration uses military tribunals to try foreigners. Id. Like other
European countries, France will not extradite suspects who might face a military
tribunal or the death penalty.” Id.
12. William R. Slomanson, Should We Try Bin Laden in Court?, THE SAN DIEGO
UNION-TRIBUNE, Nov. 7, 2001, at B9. Slomanson argues:
If the United States tries bin Laden, then the United States stands in
the shoes of Israel when it captured Adolf Eichmann, Hitler’s prime
planner of the Final Solution, for trial in Tel Aviv. Israel was thus
criticized because its local judges could not be perceived as being
impartial, given the heinousness of Eichmann’s crimes.
If the United States were to capture bin Laden or some key associates
as this long-term war wages on, it is not hard to predict an
international outcry to establish an incident-specific tribunal like the
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imposition of the death penalty, would likely generate international
furor.
III. EXTRADITION AND THE DEATH PENALTY
A. Administrative Difficulties With the Death Penalty:
13
Soering v. U.K.
Jens Soering’s murderous rampage, killing his girlfriend’s
parents, might well have been just another vicious double homicide
14
with little repercussion beyond the immediate parties. Had he
been caught, convicted and executed in the United States, his case
might have merited only the odd passing footnote. Instead,
Soering, a German national, fled to and was captured in Great
Britain, setting off an international chain of events with continuing
reverberations that now affect the war on terrorism. The Soering
case provides the jurisprudential underpinning for many human
rights obstacles to extradition under international law. It may well
15
be one of the most cited international cases and it is, in all
likelihood, the most important international extradition case of the

one in the Netherlands that tried Libya’s Pan Am 103 bombers last
year. Trial in the United States would amount to a preconceived
result, accompanied by a mock trial. Egypt—which broke ranks with
the rest of the Arab League in the 1978 Camp David Agreement with
Israel—effectively split with the United States on this very point. It was
the first country to suggest that the United States seek a resolution in
an international judicial proceeding.
Id.
13. Soering v. U.K., 11 Eur. Ct. H.R. 439 (1989).
14. The murder rate in the United States has ranged from about 20,700 in
1988 to 16,900 in 1998. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, STATISTICAL ABSTRACTS OF THE
UNITED STATES §5, 203 (2000). Even among capital cases, Jens Soering’s case was
but one of many. As of December 4, 2001, there had been 746 executions in the
United States since the reintroduction of capital punishment in 1977. DEATH
PENALTY INFORMATION CENTER, EXECUTIONS IN THE U.S. 2001, available at
http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/dpicexec01.html. By 2002 there were 3,718
persons on death row in the U.S. DEATH PENALTY INFORMATION CENTER, SIZE OF
DEATH ROW BY YEAR, available at
http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/DRowInfo.html#year (last visited Nov. 11,
2002).
15. A Lexis-Nexis search for cases citing Soering conducted on December 4,
2001 found two United States Supreme Court opinions citing Soering, one
Australian case, twenty-one Canadian cases, forty-three United Kingdom cases, and
the Commonwealth and Irish file folder under Lexis-Nexis (which overlaps the
previous categories somewhat) contained fifty-seven citations.
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16

Twentieth Century.
Jens Soering, aged 18, suffered from a well-recognized
17
psychiatric syndrome known as ‘folie ˆ deux’ which lessened
18
“mental responsibility for his acts.” According to the psychiatric
evidence, Soering’s personality became submerged into that of his
profoundly disturbed and delusional girlfriend who persuaded him
that “he might have to kill her parents for she and him to survive as
19
a couple.”
Both the United States and Germany sought to extradite and
try him for the double homicide occurring in Bedford County,
Virginia. Germany’s attempt appears to have been an effort to
20
spare one of their nationals from the death penalty. Although its
21
request to extradite Soering was eventually denied, the fact that
22
Germany pursued such an uncommon strategy against U.S. wishes
can be seen as demonstrating an increasing European aversion
towards extraditing persons who might be subject to the death
penalty. It is likely that Germany would not have interfered in what
was otherwise an inconsequential extradition matter between the
United Kingdom and the United States but for the possibility of the
imposition of the death penalty on one of its nationals. The case
also demonstrates a heightened sensitivity towards consideration of
international human rights norms in extradition matters, and a
23
24
concomitant erosion of the rule of non-inquiry.
16. “The best known case brought before the European Court of Human
Rights in the field of extradition is that of Soering v. United Kingdom.” Peter
Hodgkinson, Europe-A Death Penalty Free Zone: Commentary and Critique of Abolitionist
Strategies, 26 OHIO N.U.L. REV. 625, 629 (2000). Matthew W. Henning calls it “one
of the most famous cases of international extradition law.” Henning, supra note
11, at 355.
17. Also known as “shared psychotic disorder.” Individuals affected by the
disorder “usually have a close relationship with a dominant person . . . whose
psychotic thinking they come to share.” RONALD J. COMER, FUNDAMENTALS OF
ABNORMAL PSYCHOLOGY 350 (1996).
18. Soering v. U.K., App. No. 14038/88, 11 Eur. H.R. Rep. 439, 446 (1989).
19. Id.
20. Unlike English courts which ordinarily do not exert extraterritorial
jurisdiction over their citizens. Id. at 448, German courts can apply their own
national criminal law to acts committed abroad by a German National, but in the
case of murder would not impose the death penalty. Id. at 461-62.
21. Id. at 445.
22. Id. at 452 (noting that “[c]oncurrent requests for extradition in respect of
the same crime from two different States are not a common occurrence”).
23. Matthew W. Henning, Extradition Controversies: How Enthusiastic Prosecutions
Can Lead to International Incidents, 22 B.C. Int’l & Comp. L. Rev. 347, 356-57
(1999). Henning writes:
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The combination of these two themes—the move in the
direction of viewing the death penalty as a per se human rights
violation and the increasing willingness to look behind extradition
requests where human rights violations are alleged—is, in part, the
focus of the present inquiry. However, Soering does not go so far as
25
to make the death penalty a per se bar to extradition. It was only
the first step in a process that continues to this day.
The United Kingdom deemed the United States (which had
26
made the earlier request for extradition, and which was also the
locus of the crime) to be the appropriate jurisdiction to which
27
Soering should be extradited. The matter of the death penalty,
28
however, remained an obstacle.
Article IV of the United Kingdom-United States Extradition
Treaty provides in part: “extradition may be refused unless the
requesting Party gives assurance satisfactory to the requested Party
29
that the death penalty will not be carried out.” Responding to this
provision in the extradition request, the Commonwealth’s Attorney
for Bedford County, Virginia certified that “a representation will be
made in the name of the United Kingdom to the judge at the time
of sentencing that it is the wish of the United Kingdom that the
30
death penalty should not be imposed or carried out.” The
prosecutor gave no further assurances and stated that he intended
to pursue the death penalty at trial “because the evidence . . .
31
supported such action.” In the face of this less than ironclad
32
representation, the United Kingdom decided to allow the
[T]he ECHR’s decision presented the prospect that European courts
could abandon the principle of non-inquiry and conduct their own
examinations of the human rights record of requesting states. The
decision also validated the practice of courts in civil law countries
undertaking meaningful review of the requesting countries’
extradition petitions and possibly expanding the review to include the
requesting countries’ human rights practices.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
24. “The ‘rule of non-inquiry’ usually requires extradition courts to refrain
from undertaking inquiries into the justice systems of foreign countries.” CornejoBarreto v. Seifert, 218 F.3d 1004, 1009 n.5 (9th Cir. 2000).
25. Soering, 11 Eur. H.R. Rep. at 499.
26. Id. at 445.
27. Id.
28. Id. at 444.
29. Id. at 451.
30. Id. at 445.
31. Id. at 446.
32. The Divisional Court observed, “the assurance leaves something to be
desired.” Id. at 447.
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33

extradition and the case wound its way from the European
Commission on Human Rights to the European Court of Human
34
Rights.
The European Convention for the Protection of Human
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (which came into force in
35
1953) did not abolish capital punishment. Indeed, Article 2 of
the Convention expressly reserved the ultimate punishment under
36
certain narrowly defined circumstances. As of the date of the
Soering case, the United Kingdom had not ratified Optional
Protocol No. 6 to the Convention (which obligated contracting
37
nations to abolish capital punishment). Thus, despite Amnesty
38
International’s efforts as Amicus Curiae, Soering did not present a
promising vehicle for a per se rule against extraditing a person
facing a possible death sentence in the requesting country.
Nonetheless, Soering presented difficult issues involving the
administration of the death penalty. Article 3 of the Convention
provides that “[n]o one shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman
39
or degrading treatment or punishment.” While the death penalty
might not be a per se violation of human rights under the
Convention, it was open to question whether its administration in
the United States constituted “inhuman or degrading treatment or
40
punishment.”
33. Id. at 448 (“[O]n 3 August 1988 the Secretary of State signed a warrant
ordering the applicant’s surrender to the United States authorities”).
34. Id. at 463.
35. See The European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms, available at
http://www1.umn.edu/humanrts/instree/z17euroco.html.
36. Article 2 § 1 of the European Convention for the Protection of Human
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms provides: “Everyone’s right to life shall be
protected by law. No one shall be deprived of his life intentionally save in
execution of a sentence of a court following his conviction of a crime for which
this penalty is provided by law.” The next section proceeds to exempt various
legitimate
law
enforcement
actions,
available
at
http://www1.umn.edu/humanrts/instree/z17euroco.html.
37. Peter Hodgkinson, Europe A-Death Penalty Free Zone: Commentary and
Critique of Abolitionist Strategies, 26 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 625, 661 (2000). The United
Kingdom formally ratified Optional Protocol No. 6 on January 27, 1998. Id. at
661. The United Kingdom had abolished capital punishment in 1965 for murder
but retained the penalty for cases of treason, piracy involving violence, and various
offenses under military law. Id. at 638.
38. Soering, 11 Eur. H.R. Rep. 439, 457 (1989).
39. Article 3 of the European Convention for the Protection of Human
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, available at
http://www1.umn.edu/humanrts/instree/z17euroco.html.
40. Id.
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Jens Soering presented a particularly sympathetic case for this
41
sort of analysis. He was young and highly suggestible. He
suffered from a mental disorder that likely would have provided a
partial defense (short of the all-or-nothing insanity defense) in
42
43
Great Britain but not in Virginia. If he were to be sentenced to
death he realistically could expect to spend 6-8 years on death
44
45
row. Thus, it would give rise to the “death row phenomenon.”
Most tellingly, contrary to the extradition treaty expectations, the
assurances given (that the prosecutor would advise the judge of the
United Kingdom’s position while continuing to pursue a death
verdict) left little doubt that the possibility of the imposition of the
46
death penalty remained a realistic possibility. Finally, there was
47
no need for Soering to escape punishment entirely. Germany was
willing to prosecute him, and there he would not face the death
48
penalty. In retrospect, it seems obvious that U.S. interests would
have to give way. It remained to be seen just how problematic for
U.S. foreign policy this case ultimately would be.
The European Court of Human Rights held that extradition
under these conditions would constitute inhuman or degrading
treatment under Article 3 of the European Convention for the

41. Soering, 11 Eur. H.R. Rep. at 443.
42. Id. at 446.
43. Stamper v. Commonwealth, 324 S.E.2d 682, 688 (Va. 1985) (“[E]vidence
of a criminal defendant’s mental state at the time of the offense is, in the absence
of an insanity defense, irrelevant to the issue of guilt.”); Jenkins v. Commonwealth,
423 S.E.2d 360, 368 (Va. 1992) (holding that the defense was not permitted to
offer a manslaughter defense based on diminished capacity).
44. Soering, 11 Eur. H.R. Rep. at 457.
45. The death row phenomenon refers to the suffering of prisoners who
await execution for long periods of time. The issue is whether the death row
phenomenon constitutes “inhuman or degrading” treatment within the terms of
the relevant human rights treaty. Perhaps the most extensive analysis of this
phenomenon was undertaken by the Privy Council Office Judicial Committee in
Pratt v. Attorney General of Jamaica, 2 A.C.1, 4 All E.R. 769 (P.C. 1993). Their
Lordships wrote:
There is an instinctive revulsion against the prospect of hanging a man
after he has been held under sentence of death for many years. What
gives rise to this instinctive revulsion? The answer can only be our
humanity; we regard it as an inhuman act to keep a man facing the
agony of execution over a long extended period of time.
Id. at 29.
46. Soering, 11 Eur. H.R. Rep. at 445-47.
47. Id. at 444-45.
48. Id.
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49

Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms. The
death penalty, it held, was not an absolute bar to extradition, with
or without adequate assurances, but the precedent had been set for
human rights challenges to extradition requests carrying the
50
possibility of the death penalty.
Judge De Mayer’s lone concurring opinion in Soering advanced
the stronger position that the death penalty by itself, aside from any
implementation or administrative problems, constitutes a bar to
extradition unless the requesting state provides appropriate
51
assurances. In Judge De Mayer’s view, “the most important issue
in this case is not ‘the likelihood of the feared exposure . . . to the
death row phenomenon’ but the very simple fact that his life would
52
be put in jeopardy by the said extradition.” Judge De Mayer went
on to argue that “[w]hen a person’s right to life is involved, no
requested State can be entitled to allow a requesting State to do
53
what the requested State is not itself allowed to do.” This view has
54
not received much scholarly attention. This article, however,
argues that it has become the basis for future international
55
extradition cases involving the death penalty. Moreover, it is
indicative of an increasingly common judicial attitude that permits
greater scope for consideration of human rights norms in
extradition matters generally and a greater impatience with strict
adherence to the rule on non-inquiry.
56
This article holds, contrary to earlier scholarly opinion (but
in line with Judge De Mayer), that this fact-based or “balancing”
inquiry is, in part, because of the world-wide movement towards
57
abolition of the death penalty. This movement is veering towards
49. Id. at 448.
50. See id.
51. Id. at 483-85.
52. Id. 483-84 (De Mayer, J., concurring).
53. Id.
54. A Lexis-Nexis search revealed only two articles that referred to Judge De
Mayer’s concurring opinion in Soering v. United Kingdom.
55. See infra Part III.A.-D.
56. See John Dugard & Vanden Wyngert, Reconciling Extradition With Human
Rights, 92 AM. J. INT’ L L. 187, 197 (1998) (“As international law does not prohibit
the death penalty, the fact that the fugitive will be executed if returned to the
requested state cannot per se obstruct extradition. The manner of execution,
however, may constitute cruel or inhuman punishment, in which case extradition
should be refused.”) (citations omitted). While their decision was clearly correct
in 1998, subsequent decisions may have so undercut their thesis so as to warrant a
stronger position.
57. See, e.g., WILLIAM A. SCHABAS, THE ABOLITION OF THE DEATH PENALTY IN
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a per se rule absolutely barring nations from extraditing from
abolitionist countries to retentionist countries, unless adequate
assurances are obtained. If true, this trend presents challenges for
U.S. foreign policy in general, and specifically in the war against
terrorism. It also has profound implications for other similar
human rights issues such as the use of military courts in the
formally undeclared war against terrorism. We take these issues up
in the next sections.
IV. THE MOVEMENT TOWARD A PER SE RULE BARRING EXTRADITION
ABSENT ASSURANCES THAT THE DEATH PENALTY
W ILL NOT BE IMPOSED
A. Consolidation and Expansion of the Soering Rule
The Soering case turned on Article 3 of the Convention
(concerning inhuman or degrading treatment) in part because the
United Kingdom had not as of the date of the case ratified the
58
Optional Protocol No. 6 completely abolishing the death penalty.
The Court had no reason to consider whether a country that had
fully abolished the death penalty and had ratified Protocol No. 6
could automatically refuse to extradite absent truly adequate
assurances that the death penalty would not be imposed or
executed.
Aylor-Davis v. France, involved a country that had ratified
Optional Protocol No. 6, but the United States had, in that case,
given adequate assurances that the death penalty would not be
imposed.
In that posture, the European Human Rights
Commission ruled that the extradition would not violate either
59
Article 3 or Protocol No. 6.
60
Protocol 6’s absolute wording, combined with the fact that its
INTERNATIONAL LAW, 2d Ed. (Cambridge 1997); Ariane M. Schreiber, States That
Kill: Discretion and the Death Penalty - A Worldwide Perspective, 29 CORNELL INT’ L L.J.
263, 278-84 (1996) (outlining international efforts to abolish the death penalty);
Hodgkinson, supra note 16, at 629 (outlining European efforts to abolish the
death penalty); Ved P. Nanda, Bases For Refusing International Extradition Requests Capital Punishment and Torture, 23 FORDHAM INT’ L L.J. 1369, 1370-1394 (2000).
58. Hodgkinson, supra note 37, at 630.
59. Id.
60. Protocol No. 6 to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights
and Fundamental Freedoms concerning the Abolition of the Death Penalty, Mar.
1, 1985, art. 1, Europ.T.S. No. 114, available at
http://conventions.coe.int/treaty/EN/cadreprincipal.htm (“The death penalty
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61

commands are non-derogable and that countries cannot make
62
reservations thereto, lends credence to the view that the duty to
seek adequate assurances may well be absolute and not dependent
on the receiving state’s good or bad administration of its death
penalty. Nonetheless, in Netherlands v. Short, the Dutch High Court
“was not prepared to find that the Sixth Protocol took precedence”
63
over other international obligations. However, the court did
64
refuse to extradite after balancing the interests of both parties.
While Short followed the Soering balancing of interests model and
was not predicated on Protocol No. 6 as an absolute bar to
extradition, the decision was clearly influenced by Protocol No. 6.
Short may be seen as a transitional case much like the many
transitional cases that occurred in the United States with regard to
the issue of the right to counsel. The United States Supreme
Court’s first, hesitant due process balancing analysis under Powell v.
65
66
Alabama was followed by several smaller steps before the absolute
rule requiring counsel in all felony cases was finally imposed by
67
Gideon v. Wainwright. It is not uncommon in the development of
the law for a rule to begin as a fact-bound response to a shocking
fact pattern and to be transformed into an absolute rule by later
shall be abolished. No one shall be condemned to such penalty or executed.”).
Article 2 provides the only exceptions, allowing the death penalty for “acts
committed in time of war or of imminent threat of war.” Id. at art. 2.
61. Id. at art. 3.
62. Id. at art. 4.
63. Dugard & Wyngert, supra note 56, at 193.
64. Id. (“On this basis, it held that Short’s interest in not being handed over
should prevail over the Government’s interest in extraditing him to the United
States.”).
65. 287 U.S. 45 (1932). Powell involved seven young African Americans
known as the “Scottsboro boys” who were sentenced to death in a trial without the
aid of counsel. Id. at 50. The Supreme Court held that whether due process
required counsel should be decided on a case-by-case basis and based on the
egregious facts of the case, the court should have appointed counsel. Id. at 65.
The case, and its jurisprudential implications, is described at some length in Alan
W. Clarke, Procedural Labyrinths and the Injustice of Death: A Critique of Death Penalty
Habeas Corpus, 29 U. RICH. L. REV. 1327, 1335-44 (1995).
66. See, e.g., Uveges v. Pennsylvania, 335 U.S. 437, 441 (1948) (circumstances
peculiar to the case may render trial fundamentally unfair unless the defendant
has the aid of counsel); Bute v. Illinois, 333 U.S. 640, 680 (1948) (counsel
required as a matter of course in all capital cases); Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455
(1942) (states not required to provide counsel in non-capital state proceedings
unless on the totality of the facts one would be necessary for a fair trial); Johnson
v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 463 (1938) (counsel required to be appointed in federal
trials unless knowledgeably waived).
67. 372 U.S. 335 (1963) (overruling Betts, 316 U.S. 455).

http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol29/iss3/14

12

Clarke: Terrorism, Extradition, and the Death Penalty
CLARKE FORMATTED.DOC

2003]

EXTRADITION AND THE DEATH PENALTY

2/7/2003 2:20 PM

795

somewhat less shocking, but nonetheless compelling, cases piled on
one after the other. The process may not yet be complete in the
extradition of death-eligible persons under international law but
the trend is plain. While predictions about the law’s likely
development are hazardous, as will be demonstrated, the trend is in
the direction of an absolute rule not dependent on delicate fact
balancing.
Optional Protocol No. 6 only applies to nations within the
68
Council of Europe that have ratified the accord. Whatever its
status as a Pan-European treaty, Protocol No. 6 cannot provide
more than persuasive force to other non-European nations. Thus,
the majority analysis in Soering, which encouraged fact balancing
that at least sometimes allowed for the extradition of persons who
were death-eligible in the receiving nation, continued to play an
important role in forming international opinion. Indeed, until the
trend towards a per se rule is absolutely established, Soering’s
equivocal rationale is likely to continue to play a role in
international decision-making in at least some parts of the world.
In addition, notwithstanding the status of a per se rule in death
penalty matters, Soering’s mode of analysis will continue to have
force in other analogous matters such as the use of military trials
where injection of human rights issues and balancing of facts will
probably continue.
Soering’s “death row phenomenon” analysis very quickly
69
influenced cases around the world. Treatment of Reference re Ng
68. Thirty-nine nations within the Council of Europe had ratified Protocol
No. 6 as of August 12, 2001. Three nations had signed the Protocol but had not
yet ratified it. Council of Europe, Legal Protocol No. 6 has been amended by
eleven nations which in turn, has been ratified by forty-one nations, but two
signatories have not yet ratified as of August 12, 2001. Council of Europe, Legal
Affairs, Treaty Office available at
http://conventions.coe.int/treaty/EN/cadreprincipal.htm.
Protocol No. 11
restructures the control machinery including the European Court of Human
Rights. Council of Europe, Legal Affairs, Treaty Office, available at
http://conventions.coe.int/treaty/EN/cadreprincipal.htm. For a history of the
abolition of the death penalty in Europe and a state by state analysis of the
ratification of Protocol No. 6 see Hodgkinson, supra note 37.
69. Not all of the influenced cases were extradition cases. One of the most
famous death row phenomenon cases involved an appeal to the Privy Council
alleging that the harsh death row conditions in Jamaica constituted cruel,
inhuman and degrading punishment. Pratt v. Attorney General of Jamaica,
[1994] 2 A.C.1, (P.C. 1993) (appeal taken from Jamaica). The Privy Council’s
unanimous recommendation to Her Majesty that the sentences be commuted,
signified a reprieve for more than 200 death sentenced prisoners in the
Caribbean. The Judicial Privy Council, of the United Kingdom remains the
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Extradition and Kindler v. Canada (Minister of Justice) from the
Canadian Supreme Court provide instructive examples. Both Ng
and Kindler faced the death penalty if extradited to the United
States. The extradition treaty with the United States allowed the
Canadian Minister of Justice to seek assurances that the death
penalty would not be imposed or executed. In both instances, the
72
Minister ordered extradition without seeking such assurances. In
both cases the Canadian Supreme Court found that the Minister of
Justice had not abused his discretion in extraditing death-eligible
persons to the United States and that such extradition did not
73
violate Canada’s Charter of Rights. Both men were extradited
and in both cases an after-the-fact appeal was taken to the United
74
Nations Human Rights Committee. The Committee refused to
hold that the death row phenomenon, by itself, constituted a
human rights violation under the International Covenant of Civil
75
and Political Rights.
It distinguished Soering, whose age and
mental condition bolstered the claim that he would face inhuman
76
and degrading treatment. Thus, in Kindler, the Human Rights
77
Committee affirmed Canada’s decision to extradite.
The
committee, however, ruled that Ng, (who faced death by cyanide
asphyxiation, rather than lethal injection, as in Kindler’s case) was
78
improperly extradited.
Ng and Kindler made it clear that
international law provides no per se bar to extraditing death
eligible persons, and each case will have to be analyzed on a case by
case basis.
B. Muddled Drift
One solution for extradition courts in abolitionist countries is
to avoid international law altogether in coming to the conclusion

ultimate court of appeal for sixteen Commonwealth countries. Bertodano,
Fighting for Justice in Shadow of the Gallows, Sun. Telegraph Ltd. 16, Nov. 7, 1993.
70. [1991] 84 D.L.R. (4th) 498.
71. [1991] 2 S.C.R. 779.
72. Id. at 780; Reference re Ng Extradition, [1991] 84 D.L.R. (4th) 498 at
501.
73. Matthew W. Henning, Extradition Controversies: How Enthusiastic Prosecution
Can Lead to International Incidents, 22 B.C. INT’ L & COMP. L. REV. 347, 358 (1999).
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. Id. at 359.
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that there can be no extradition of anyone who potentially faces
the death penalty. This may have been the approach of the Italian
79
Constitutional Court in Venezia v. Ministero di Grazia e Giustizia.
The Venezia court refused to extradite a death-eligible U.S. citizen
despite assurances from U.S. authorities that he would not receive
the death penalty. Instead, Venezia was forced to face trial in Italy
for crimes committed in the United States. The court reasoned
that in Italy “the prohibition on the death penalty . . . is absolute
and precludes extradition for a capital offense on the basis of an
evaluation by government officials or the courts of the sufficiency
80
of assurances[.]”
The court relied entirely on Italian constitutional law without
mention of international law. Professor Bianchi of the University
of Sienna speculated that “[i]t is hard to tell whether the court
deliberately avoided” mention of international law because of the
apparent “conflict between different treaty requirements” or lack of
81
familiarity with “the relevant international law instruments.”
Professor Bianchi points out that the Constitutional court had
82
often invoked international law principles and trends in the past.
In this case, the Italian Constitutional Court may have been
struggling with a way to create a per se bar to extradition in a
context of international law that did not quite reach the right
result. It is overly facile in this context to accuse the court of
“result oriented jurisprudence.” Rather, this case properly may be
viewed as a halting and somewhat anomalous step toward an
international per se rule barring extradition of death-eligible
persons. Of course, Italy’s refusal to extradite at all and its decision
requiring trial in Italy went further than anything required under
any interpretation of international law. One does not know what
the decision of that court might have been had there been clear
international rules that absolutely guaranteed that there would be
no possibility of capital punishment. In short, Venezia may be either
a halting step in the trend or just a very peculiar case. Just which is
not clear.
It should be clear from the foregoing that European countries

79. Andrea Bianchi, International Decision: Venezia v. Ministero Di Grazia E
Giustizia. Judgment No. 223. 79 Rivista di Diritto Internazionale 815 (1996). Italian
Constitutional Court, June 27, 1996, 91 A.J.I.L. 727 (1997).
80. Id. at 727.
81. Id. at 731.
82. Id.
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that have ratified Optional Protocol No. 6 are not likely to extradite
anyone who is death-eligible regardless of the circumstances.
Europe is for all practical purposes a death penalty-free extradition
83
zone. It only remains for the rest of the world to sweep away factbound analysis in favor of a more efficient and less contentious per
se rule. That event may depend in part upon intellectual support
cases from around the world that creep toward a per se rule
barring extradition in potentially capital cases. That is what is
happening.
C. Transition to an Absolute Rule
1. Canada’s Reversal: United States v. Burns
The most startling and perhaps clearest indicator of the
direction of death penalty extradition law after Soering is
unquestionably the Canadian Supreme Court’s dramatic about-face
84
in United States v. Burns. Recall that in 1991 Ng and Kindler had
held that a decision of the Minister of Justice to extradite deatheligible persons back to the United States did not violate the
Canadian Charter of Rights. Burns, only ten years later and clearly
influenced by the intervening trends in international law, reversed
course.
Canadians Glenn Sebastian Burns and Atif Ahmad Rafay both
faced capital murder charges in the United States. The Minister of
85
Justice ordered extradition without seeking assurances.
A
83.
This conclusion is strengthened by Protocol 13 (which opened for
signature May 2002). Protocol 13 goes further than Protocol 6 and abolishes the
death penalty under all circumstances including acts committed in time of war.
Moreover, Protocol 13 prohibits derogations and reservations. Thirty-nine nations
have signed Protocol 13 and five have ratified it. It becomes effective three
months after ten member states have expressed their consent to be bound. With
the advent of Protocol 13, extradition from Europe in capital cases without
assurances as to the death penalty becomes almost unimaginable. Death Penalty
Information Center, The Death Penalty: An International Perspective, available at
http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/dpicintl.html.
84. [2001] D.L.R. (4th) 1.
85. Apparently Ministers of Justice exercised their prerogative to seek
assurances in death penalty cases rather sparingly.
The Ottawa Citizen
editorialized:
[I]f it is an unjustified evil for the government to kill people in
Canada, is it not a similar evil to participate in the killing of people in
the United States?
No easy answer. But the extradition treaty invites Canadian justice
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unanimous Canadian Supreme Court held that while the Canadian
Charter of Rights and Freedoms did not create a per se rule
barring extradition of death-eligible persons in all cases, “such
assurances [agreeing not to impose the death penalty] are
86
constitutionally required in all but exceptional circumstances.”
The Court declined to define or speculate on what might constitute
“exceptional circumstances,” saying, “in the absence of exceptional
circumstances, which we refrain from trying to anticipate,
assurances in death penalty cases are always constitutionally
87
required.”
Plainly, the Canadian Supreme Court is moving very close to a
per se rule. This is as close to a conclusive presumption as one can
get without actually having it. Ministers of Justice in Canada no
doubt will get the message and routinely seek assurances before
extradition in potentially capital cases. Of course terrorists from alQaeda might constitute those “exceptional circumstances” reserved
in the opinion. Burns did nominally approve the “balancing
88
process” set out by Ng and Kindler. Close analysis of the Court’s
rationale, however, demonstrates that Burns has jettisoned singleminded reliance on the “death row phenomenon” or any other
remediable administrative deficiencies. It has moved to a rationale
that is far more compatible with a per se rule than the equitable
fact-balancing rule of Soering. As we will demonstrate, Burns is only
nominally a balancing case dependent on the individual facts of the
matter at hand.
The greatest part of the Burns opinion turns on “the factors
that appear to weigh against extradition without assurances that the
89
death penalty will not be imposed.” Any fair reading of this
section will satisfy the reader that most of the reasons for refusing
to extradite in this case revolve around matters that could not be
fixed by any retentionist nation, and indeed, revolve around trends
that are only likely to cut more and more against capital
punishment. Moreover, the innocence argument, which the Burns

ministers to avoid complicity in capital punishment, and they surely
ought to try more often than once in 20 years.
Extradition Misgivings: Two accused killers have been extradited to the U.S. without
Canada invoking a death-penalty safeguard, OTTAWA CITIZEN, July 17, 1996, at A10.
86. Burns, [2001] D.L.R. (4th) at ¶ 8.
87. Id. at ¶ 65 (emphasis added).
88. Id. at ¶ 67.
89. Id. at ¶ 75.
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90

Court makes for the first time, is fundamentally at odds with a
cure for any capital punishment system.
The section analyzing factors that . . . weigh against extradition
begins with Section (a) “Principles of Criminal Justice as Applied in
91
Canada” which focuses exclusively on Canada’s abolition of the
death penalty and the values implicated by that abolition. While
general, abstract jurisprudential principles never can be dispositive
of narrowly specific issues, the fact that this opening section is cast
in absolute terms may be seen as a harbinger of the rationale to
follow. The last part of the section is illustrative of the whole:
It is, however, incontestable that capital punishment . . .
engages the underlying values of the prohibition against
cruel and unusual punishment. It is final. It is
irreversible.
Its imposition has been described as
arbitrary. Its deterrent value has been doubted. Its
implementation necessarily causes psychological and
physical suffering. It has been rejected by the Canadian
Parliament for offences committed within Canada. Its
potential imposition in this case is thus a 92
factor that
weighs against extradition without assurances.
With the exception of the last sentence, every word presages a
rationale that is virtually absolute. As we will see, this rationale goes
far beyond the broad platitudes of the first section.
Section (b) focuses on Canadian and international initiatives
93
to abolish the death penalty. In page after carefully detailed page,
the Court reports the worldwide trend toward abolition of the
death penalty. Very little of this supports ad hoc determinations
that would even occasionally permit the extradition of someone
who faced the possibility of capital punishment. Indeed, the Court
points out that:
Amnesty International reports that in 1948, the year in
which the Universal Declaration of Human Rights was
adopted, only eight countries were abolitionist. In
January 1998 . . . 90 countries retained the death penalty,
while 61 were totally abolitionist, 14 (including Canada at
the time) were classified as abolitionist for ordinary
crimes and 27 were considered to be abolitionist de facto
(no executions for the past 10 years) for a total of 102
abolitionist countries. At the present time, it appears that
90. The author is unaware of any international extradition case before Burns
that makes the innocence argument as forcefully and as well as the Court in Burns.
91. Burns, [2001] D.L.R. (4th) at ¶¶ 75-6.
92. Id. at ¶ 80.
93. Id. at ¶¶ 78-9.
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the death penalty is now abolished (apart from
exceptional offences such as treason) in 108 countries.
These general statistics mask the important point that
abolitionist states include all of the major democracies
except some of the United States, India and Japan.
According to statistics filed by Amnesty International on
this appeal, 85 percent of the world’s executions in 1999
were accounted for by only five countries: the94United
States, China, the Congo, Saudi Arabia and Iran.
The Court does acknowledge that “[t]his evidence does not
establish an international law norm against . . . extradition to face
95
the death penalty.” This language is certainly consistent with an
ad hoc approach. But the rationale undergirding it is absolutist.
In any event, no reasonable person would argue that Burns speaks
with only one voice or that the case directly and unambiguously
posits a per se rule against extradition of death-eligible persons.
The claim herein is more modest—that Burns is a transitional case
that speaks one way while moving in another. Such cases are not
96
unheard of in the history of jurisprudence.
97
Only Section (c) treats issues that are unambiguously factbound and which would lead to an ad hoc balancing approach.
Here the Court, in one lone paragraph, details the mitigating
factors that international courts since Soering have looked to in
denying extradition.
Section (d), which embraces “other factors weighing against
98
extradition,” may be the most telling part of the entire opinion.
The largest and first part of this section deals not with the
traditional “death row phenomenon” argument first raised in
Soering, but rather with the fact that innocent people are being
convicted of capital crimes, not just in countries like Iran and Iraq,
but in the United States. Perhaps to ease some of the sting of the
94. Id. at ¶ 91.
95. Id. at ¶ 89.
96. The use of the word jurisdiction to describe the ambit of a writ of habeas
corpus long after courts had gained the power to release persons for nonjurisdictional errors is another example of this process whereby jurisprudential
language expands and expands until it is clear that the concept has been radically
changed. See, e.g., Alan Clarke, Habeas Corpus: The Historical Debate, 14 N.Y.L. SCH.
J. HUM. RTS. 375, 402-23 (1998) (detailing historical development of the
expansion of habeas corpus from a narrowly confined writ limited to jurisdictional
error to one that reached many fundamental constitutional errors that lay beyond
original conceptions of jurisdiction).
97. Burns, [2001] D.L.R. (4th) at ¶¶ 92-3.
98. Id. at ¶¶ 93-4.
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charge the Court begins, not with innocent people on the U.S.
death row, but rather with the Canadian experience with
convicting innocent people of what would, before abolition, have
been capital crimes. The Court spends ten full paragraphs on
99
innocence issues in Canada. This breast-beating is not without
purpose. It allows the Court to pull no punches when it turns to
the U.S. experience. In thirteen paragraphs it outlines the now
well-known problems from the repeated calls for moratoria, to the
Illinois experience where there were thirteen exonerations for
every twelve executions and the recently disclosed two out of three
error rate in the system.
The Burns Court expended more energy and ink analyzing the
problems associated with miscarriages of justice in capital and
potentially capital cases than it did with any other issue. This is
important because, unlike other administrative critiques of the
death penalty (for example, the death row phenomenon),
innocence is not an issue that could likely be corrected by the
receiving nation. When one looks at administrative issues in any
judicial system, one generally looks at things that, at least in theory,
can be corrected. If corrected, the objection predicated thereon
disappears. If Due Process is being denied in a particular nation,
and extradition is denied on that basis, that can be rectified.
Presumably, the “death row phenomenon” can be rectified.
Indeed, the Anti-Terrorist and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996
100
(AEDPA) is an attempt by the U.S. to do just that. It is, however,
hard to see how any retentionist nation can rectify the problem of
convicting the innocent in capital cases. While this seems on first
impression like a factual matter susceptible of an administrative
cure, the practical impediments make such a case only a thin
theoretical possibility. It is hard to imagine a judicial system that
did not convict the innocent, and in retentionist regimes, this
101
means executing the innocent.
The efficiencies of speed
generated by such laws as the AEDPA, by cutting out procedural
protections, increase the probability of executing the innocent.
Perversely, the attempt to repair the death row phenomenon works
to increase the problem of the innocent at the gallows. It is not
easy to see how this tension can be resolved. Moreover, hydraulic
99. Id. at ¶¶ 95-104.
100. Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214 (1999) (effective April 24, 1996).
101. See Laurie Anne Whitt, Alan W. Clarke & Eric Lambert, Innocence Matters:
How Innocence Recasts the Death Penalty Debate, 38 CRIM. LAW BULL. 670 (2002).
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pressure within the capital punishment system probably insures
that the U.S. capital punishment regime increases the likelihood of
102
convicting and ultimately executing the innocent.
By focusing on innocence, Burns presents a conundrum. It
speaks in language that purports to require the Minister of Justice
(and lower courts) to engage in fact-bound analysis in the face of a
strong presumption against extradition in potentially capital cases.
But it provides criteria in its rationale that are virtually impossible
to satisfy. The criteria cut against each other such that if you satisfy
one, you are forced to violate the other—repair the length of stays
on death row at the expense of increasing the probability of
executing the innocent. Thomas Hobson could not have improved
103
on this.
If the Canadian Supreme Court remains faithful to its
rationale in Burns, extradition of death-eligibles to the U.S. absent
assurances has ended. Burns, while nominally a balancing case like
Soering, rests on principles fundamentally at odds with that precept.
Thus, Burns is a key transitional case from a balancing fact-bound
approach to a per se approach. Given the trends elsewhere Burns
presages, but does not announce, a new, stronger, international
rule in death penalty extradition cases.
2. South Africa: Mohamed & Others v. RSA & Others
In an as yet little-noticed case, the South African
Constitutional Court dropped a potential bombshell. Mohamed &
104
Another v. President of the RSA & Others announced a per se rule
against either extradition or deportation in lieu of extradition.
While the decision was predicated on South African Constitutional
law, the court’s extensive discussion of international law placed the
case a step closer to an international rule absolutely barring
extradition of death-eligibles absent adequate assurances that the
death penalty will not be imposed or executed. The fact that this
102. Samuel R. Gross, The Risks of Death: Why Erroneous Convictions Are Common
in Capital Cases, 44 BUFF. L. REV. 469, 475-96 (1996) (discussing the “production of
errors” that occurs throughout the whole criminal justice process leading up to
capital punishment).
103. Thomas Hobson was a 17th-century horse trader who owned a stable and
gave customers the option to look at all of his horses, but would only allow
customers to purchase the horse nearest the door. The term “Hobson’s choice”
usually refers to the necessity of accepting one of two equally objectionable things.
WEBSTER’ S DICTIONARY 1076 (3d ed. 1993).
104. 2001 (7) BCLR 685 (CC).
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case came out of Africa is significant in that it demonstrates that
courts in abolitionist countries from all over the world are refusing
extradition under these circumstances.
The case also closes the door to immigration authorities using
deportation procedures to circumvent the extradition
requirements, thus making extrajudicial political deals more
difficult. If followed internationally (and this case seems to be well
within the mainstream trend) this could be one of the more
significant extradition cases.
Mohamed, a suspected member of al-Qaeda and a Tanzanian
national, was sought by the United States in connection with his
105
role in the embassy bombings in Nairobi and Dar es Salaam.
Found in Cape Town, South Africa, he was detained and ultimately
106
deported to the United States. Because immigration authorities
treated the matter as a deportation, no assurances of any kind with
107
respect to the death penalty were sought or given.
A codefendant, Mr. Mahmoud Mahmud Salim was extradited to the
United States from Germany, which did seek and receive
assurances that the death penalty would neither be imposed nor
108
executed. South Africa, like Germany, has abolished the death
109
penalty. The Constitutional Court held that “[t]he handing over
of Mohamed to the United States government agents for removal
110
by them to the United States was unlawful.” Since Mohamed had
already been extradited to the United States and was in fact in the
111
middle of his capital murder trial,
the South African
Constitutional Court’s options were quite limited; it ordered that
“the full text of this judgment to be drawn to the attention of . . .
112
the Federal Court . . . as a matter of urgency.” The U.S. District
Judge ruled that the defendant had the right to present the South
113
African Court’s ruling to the jury at the penalty phase of trial.
Although the decision was otherwise irrelevant to the defendant’s
105. Mohamed, 2001 (7) BCLR 685 at ¶¶ 7-10.
106. Id. at ¶ 11.
107. Id. at ¶ 25.
108. Mohamed, 2001 (7) BCLR 685 at ¶ 44.
109. S v. Makwanyane and Another, 1995 (6) BCLR 665 (CC).
110. Mohamed, 2001 (7) BCLR 685 at ¶ 67.
111. Jury to Hear South Africa Constitutional Court Ruling as a Mitigating Factor in
Penalty Phase, N.Y.L.J., Aug. 9, 2001, at 17.
112. Mohamed, 2001 (7) BCLR 685 at. ¶73 § (5).
113. See, e.g., Alan W. Clarke, Virginia’s Capital Murder Sentencing Proceeding: A
Defense Perspective, 18 U. RICH. L. REV. 341 (1984) for a discussion of the sentencing
or penalty phase of a capital murder trial.
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character, it was nonetheless a mitigating factor under federal law,
which permits juries to consider the fact that “[a]nother defendant
or defendants, equally culpable in the crime, will not be punished
114
by death.” The jury ultimately hung on the life or death issue at
the penalty phase and thus, Mohamed was sentenced to life
115
imprisonment.
While the Mohamed Court ultimately relied on the South
African Constitution, it analyzed international extradition law in
potentially capital cases at great length, repeatedly citing inter alia
Burns and Soering. Despite Burns and Soering’s less than absolutist
approaches, the South African Constitutional Court nonetheless
laid down an absolute rule not dependent on any fact balancing or
other ad hoc determination. While this decision is not binding on
other nations or any of the International Human Rights tribunals,
its reasoning is likely to be highly influential, particularly in
116
Commonwealth nations.
While no court has yet plainly stated
that extradition of a person facing the death penalty is absolutely
barred under international law under all circumstances, absent
satisfactory assurances, this case is another unmistakable step in
that direction.
D. Other Evidence For a Per Se Rule
There are a variety of international treaties beyond the
European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms that speak to the issue of extraditing death-eligible
people to retentionist countries, including the Second Optional
Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political
117
Rights, the Aiming at Abolition of the Death Penalty, and the
114. 18 U.S.C. § 3592(a)(4) (2002).
115. Benjamin Weiser, Embassy Bombers Sentenced, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 21, 2001, § 4,
at 2.
116. See Bruce Zagaris S. African Constitutional Court Rules Deporting Alleged
Terrorist to U.S. Violated Rights, INT’ L ENFORCEMENT LAW REP., Section: International
Terrorism (Dec. 2001) Vol. 17, No. 12.
On the one hand, the ruling has limited solace for Mohamed since he
has been deported, tried and convicted by the U.S. On the other
hand, his case has importance for future situations in South Africa and
the Commonwealth of countries, since the decision will be noted and
may be precedent in other cases, especially at a time when countries
are requesting custody of many persons accused of transnational
terrorism.
Id.
117. Second Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and
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American Convention on Human Rights. It is beyond the scope
of this paper to canvass all treaties having an impact on this subject.
However, a few brief notes about trends in extradition law as it
affects the death penalty are in order.
From the foregoing sections it may seem that only Europe and
perhaps Canada and South Africa strongly oppose extradition in
capital cases unless assurances are given. This misperception is an
artifact of the cases that the author has chosen to highlight
revolving around a very limited theme concerning the strength and
posture of the international rule in question. But the implication
of these cases is greater than that which might be supposed. One
must look at the actual situation in other regions of the world
which may not have quite so developed a jurisprudence on the
subject to understand how this issue is likely to play out in other
regions of the world.
For example, the Organization of American States (“OAS”)
involves all thirty-five nations of the Americas. Of these nations
only the United States, Guyana, Guatemala, and Belize retain the
119
death penalty.
The American Convention on Human Rights
contains language protecting against “cruel, inhuman, or
120
degrading punishment,” and is similar to European Covenant
Article 3, the subject of the Soering case. Moreover, Article 9 of the
1981 Inter-American Convention on Extradition mandates that
member States “not grant extradition when the offense in question
is punishable . . . by the death penalty” absent assurances that the
121
death penalty will not be imposed.
The attitude of our OAS neighbors concerning the United
States’ use of the death penalty is decidedly negative. The InterAmerican Commission on Human Rights in 1987 “found that the
United States’ practice of executing juveniles violated the American
122
Declaration” of the Rights and Duties of Man. How likely is it
Political Rights, opened for signature Dec. 15, 1989, 1991 U.N.T.S. 414 (entered into
force July 11, 1991).
118. Organization of American States: American Convention on Human
Rights, opened for signature Nov. 22, 1969, 9 I.L.M. 673 (1970) (entered into force
July 18, 1978).
119. Michelle McKee, Tinkering With the Machinery of Death: Understanding Why
the United States Use of the Death Penalty Violates Customary International Law, 6 BUFF.
HUM. RTS. L. REV. 153, 159 (2000).
120. American Convention on Human Rights, supra note 118, Art. 5 § 2.
121. Organization of American States: Inter-American Convention on
Extradition, Feb. 25, 1981, 20 I.L.M. 723, art. 9.
122. Laura Dalton, Note, Stanford v. Kentucky and Wilkins v. Missouri: A Violation
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that the OAS would sanction extradition on conditions less
stringent than their European counterparts? Moreover, Mexico
consistently seeks assurances in capital cases before extraditing to
123
the United States.
Thus, the United States is, for all practical
purposes, sandwiched between two nations that will not extradite in
capital cases absent assurances.
In addition, the rule of non-inquiry is undergoing significant
erosion in human rights extradition cases lying beyond the death
penalty arena. This trend makes it ever more unlikely that an
international court would, under any circumstances, allow
extradition in a potential capital case without ironclad assurances
that the death penalty would not be imposed. It likely will affect
the Bush administration’s attempt to use military courts.
V. CONCLUSION
One hundred and eleven nations of the world have now
124
abolished the death penalty.
Most are unlikely to extradite
anyone, even members of al-Qaeda, if they realistically face a
possibility of receiving the death penalty in the United States. As
more and more nations abolish capital punishment, first de facto
and then de jure, and as the rule against extradition to retentionist
nations becomes stronger, the likelihood of increasing tension in
U.S. foreign policy becomes evident.
Following September 11, America’s need to question al-Qaeda
suspects in Spain may be a difficult task in light of Spain’s refusal to
extradite unless the United States hewes to European trends
125
regarding both the death penalty and the use of military courts.
Meanwhile, Great Britain has been tying itself in knots over the

of an Emerging Rule of Customary International Law, 32 WM. & M ARY L. REV. 161, 181
(1990) (citations omitted). Justice Brennan, in his dissent in Stanford v. Kentucky,
outlines the various human rights treaties either signed or ratified by the U.S.
which “explicitly prohibit juvenile death penalties.” 492 U.S. 361, 390 (1989).
123. The extradition treaty between Mexico and the United States “clearly
prohibits the extradition of criminals when the fugitive awaits capital punishment
in the requesting State and the laws of the requested State do not permit capital
punishment for the specific offense.” Bruce Zagaris & Julia Padierna Peralta,
Mexico-United States Extradition and Alternatives: From Fugitive Slaves to Drug Traffickers
- 150 Years and Beyond the Rio Grande’s Winding Courses, 12 AM. U.J. INT’ L L. & POL’ Y
519, 539 (1997).
124. See supra note 5.
125. Bob Kemper, U.S.-Spain Pledge Anti-Terror Cooperation; Leaders Downplay
Extradition of 8 Al Qaeda Suspects, CHICAGO TRIB., Nov. 29, 2001 at N4.
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same problem of extradition to the United States. The French
Justice Minister, Marylise Lebranchu, warned that France will
oppose the death penalty for French citizen and alleged al Qaeda
member Zacarias Moussaoui, and that a death sentence will create
127
“diplomatic difficulties.”
Moussaoui, who was apprehended in
Minnesota, presents no extradition problems, but France’s strong
opposition in his case makes it even clearer (if more clarity were
needed) that no terrorist, whatever his or her crime, will be
extradited from France without ironclad assurances on the death
128
penalty. Germany is also refusing to extradite Islamic militants to
129
countries where they face the possibility of the death penalty.
U.S. Defense Secretary Donald H. Rumsfeld is quoted as saying that
the U.S. military will “try to prevent enemy leaders from falling into
the hands of peacekeeping troops from allied nations that might
130
oppose capital punishment.” One wonders to what extent U.S.
soldiers might interfere with British or French troops to accomplish
that end, or what the diplomatic consequences might be if there
was an armed showdown?
Plainly, this issue will continue to nettle U.S. foreign policy
experts with repercussions that are wide ranging and difficult to
predict. Given that “the hunt for fresh targets in pursuing al-Qaeda
131
has now spread to Africa, South America and the Balkans,” the
problems for U.S. foreign policy can only increase. Thus, the
question becomes: will U.S. policy and public opinion change to
conform to international norms, or will the United States continue
to pay an increasingly heavy price for its love affair with capital
punishment?

126. Philip Johnston, Britain Could Face Dilemma Over bin Laden Death Penalty,
THE DAILY TELEGRAPH (London) Dec. 11, 2001, at 14.
127. Minister Warns of Rift Over Death Penalty For Sept. 11 Suspect, AGENCE FRANCE
PRESSE, Dec. 12, 2001, at *1.
128. Id.
129. Interior Minister Otto Schily ordered raids that captured persons having
alleged ties to Osama bin Laden. Turkey has demanded the extradition of one,
but Germany has refused because of the possibility of the death penalty under
Turkish law. Germany Targets Muslim Groups, (Dec. 12, 2001) at
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/europe/1705606.stm.
130. Paul Richter, U.S. Leaders Begin to Plan Ways to Bring Prisoners to Justice,
M ILWAUKEE JOURNAL SENTINEL, Dec. 12, 2001 at A13.
131. Ed Vulliamy et al., US Launches Hunt for Terror Camps in Somalia, THE
OBSERVER, Dec. 9, 2001, at 1.
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